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MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS ON DEATH ROW:
UNSOLVED PUZZLES FOR COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES
Richard J. Bonnie'
The circumstances under which a defendant's mental illness or other
mental disability at the time of the offense should preclude a death
sentence are considered by other participants in the Symposium. In this
paper, I want to focus on the problems relating to mental illness or other
mental disabilities that arise after sentencing, where the underlying
values at stake are the dignity of the condemned prisoner and the
integrity of the law. I will address three conceptually independent
(although often clinically overlapping) grounds for precluding or
postponing execution of mentally ill prisoners on death row:
1. Prisoners whose impaired understanding of the nature and purpose
of the punishment may render them incompetent for execution under
Ford v. Wainwright' (I will refer to this category of prisoners as "Ford
incompetent").
2. Prisoners whose mental illness impairs their ability to assist their
lawyers or otherwise to participate meaningfully in post-conviction
proceedings (I will refer to this category of prisoners as "unable to assist
counsel").
3. Prisoners who do not want to initiate or who want to terminate
post-conviction proceedings challenging the validity of the conviction or
death sentence (I will refer to this category of prisoners as "volunteers"
for execution).
As I discuss each of these grounds for precluding execution, I will
present the pertinent text of a proposal recently approved by the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty on which I am serving.2 Parallel proposals are
also being considered by various mental health advocacy groups and
' John S. Battle Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and
Public Policy, University of Virginia.
1. 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
2. The Task Force was established under the auspices of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities. The full text of the
Task Force's proposal is set forth in this issue. See Recommendations of the American Bar
Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1115 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force
Recommendations].
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professional organizations,' and will eventually be presented for adoption
by the ABA House of Delegates.
Before turning to the specific issues raised by mentally ill prisoners on
death row, it is important to place this discussion in a somewhat broader
context. As I have written elsewhere:
Because contending moral intuitions about the death penalty
are so strongly felt, practices regarded as unproblematic
elsewhere in the administration of criminal justice inevitably
become controversial in capital cases. In some contexts . . .
disputes about particular features of the law merely echo the
overarching disputes about the legitimacy of the death penalty
itself. In most contexts, however, the arguments center on the
implications of the assertion, endorsed even by those who
believe the death penalty to be legitimate, that "the penalty of
death is qualitatively different" from other forms of criminal
punishment. From this premise, courts and commentators have
deduced an unending series of rules and obligations uniquely
applicable to capital cases.
. . . [However,] plausible arguments purporting to show why
the rules in death cases should be different can be raised in
connection with every feature of the process and that wholesale
acceptance of these arguments could make implementation of
the death penalty a practical impossibility.
4
In this paper, I aim to develop broadly acceptable solutions to the
unique problems presented by mentally ill prisoners on death row, not to
stake out symbolic positions categorically exempting people with mental
illness from the death penalty, nor to create impediments to its
administration. The goal is to correct deficiencies in current law and
practice that have allowed legitimate concerns about severely mentally ill
prisoners to be overlooked. The challenge of reform is to identify ways
of correcting these deficiencies that are also respectful of the popular will
in states with capital punishment and of the public officials who bear the
responsibility for faithfully executing the law.
With these preliminary observations in mind, I will now turn to the
threc grounds upon which execution of mentally ill prisoners should be
precluded. In each case, I will present general principles, including the
Task Force proposals, before turning to the remaining puzzles.
3. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2005), http://www.aclu.org/DeathPenalty/
DeathPenalty.Cfm?ID=17380&c+299.
4. Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L, REV. 1363, 1363-64
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
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I. IMPAIRED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OR PURPOSE OF THE
PUNISHMENT
We should begin with the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Ford v.
Wainwright,5 holding that execution of an incompetent prisoner
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. 6 Unfortunately, the Court failed to specify a constitutional
definition of incompetence or to prescribe the constitutionally required
• 7
procedures for adjudicating the issue. As expected, state and federal
courts have not been of one mind about either of these matters,' and
neither have the commentators.
Another problem is that the Court also failed to set forth a definitive
rationale for its holding that might have helped resolve these open
questions. Rather it listed, without indicating their relative importance, a
number of possible reasons for the competence requirement.' These
rationales included the need to ensure that the offenders could provide
counsel with information that might lead to vacation of sentence;' the
view that, in the words of Lord Coke, execution of "mad" people is "'a
miserable spectacle . . . of extream inhumanity and cruelty [that] can be
no example to others"';" and the notion that retribution cannot be
exacted from people who do not understand why they are being
executed. 12 Apparently, based on the latter rationale, Justice Powell, in
his concurring opinion in Ford, stated: "I would hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the
5. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
6. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. The Court addressed issues relating to competence for
execution in three previous cases. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 10, 13-14 (1950)
(holding that, as applied, a Georgia statute allowing the governor and three physicians he
appoints to determine whether an insane prisoner is now sane and can be executed does
not violate due process); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431, 439-40, 443-44 (1948) (holding that
a challenge to a California statute that only allows the prison warden to initiate
competency proceedings based on "good reason" to believe the prisoner is insane was not
ripe for review because the prisoner did not file a writ of mandamus to compel the warden
to initiate proceedings); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) (holding that the
defendant, who became insane after sentencing and conviction, did not have an absolute
right to adjudication by a court and a jury on the question of insanity).
7. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
8. Compare, e.g., Patterson v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 480, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding
that a state court's reliance on other evidence of the defendant's sanity was not
inconsistent with Ford's mandate), with Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 282 (Pa.
2002) (concluding that Ford is limited only to the imposition of the death penalty and does
not apply to a state's power to implement post-conviction procedures).
9. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-09.
10. Id. at 407.
11. Id. (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *6).
12. Id. at 409.
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punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."' 3
Justice Powell pointed out that states are free to preclude execution on
other grounds (particularly inability to assist counsel),14 but most courts
and commentators have assumed that the Eighth Amendment
requirement is limited to the test stated by Powell. 15
Most commentators have also agreed with Justice Powell's view that
the Ford competence requirement is grounded in the retributive purpose
of punishment. 6 I have also suggested that executing someone who is
unaware of the nature and purpose of the impending execution fails to
show adequate respect for the dignity of the condemned prisoner as a
human being, the foundational value of the Eighth Amendment."
With these preliminary observations in mind, let us turn to four
questions that need to be resolved.
1. What Does It Mean to "Understand" or "Appreciate" the "Purpose"
of the Punishment?
There has been some confusion about the meaning of the idea that the
prisoner must be able to understand (or be aware of) the nature and
purpose of (or reasons for) the execution. Consider the facts of Barnard
v. Collins,8 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1994. In that case, the state
habeas court had found that Barnard's "perception of the reason for his
conviction and pending execution is at times distorted by a delusional
system in which he attributes anything negative that happens to him to a
conspiracy of Asians, Jews, Blacks, homosexuals and the Mafia." 9
Despite the fact that Barnard's understanding of the reason for his
execution was impaired by delusions, the Fifth Circuit concluded that his
awareness that "his pending execution was because he had been found
13. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
14. Id. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
15. See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 2000); Cox v. Norris, 167 F.3d
1211, 1212 (8th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701 (W.D. Va. 2003);
Bruce Ebert, Competency To Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument To Evaluate an
Inmate's Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the
Execution of the Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 29 n.3 (2001). But see,
e.g., Bryan Lester Dupler, The Uncommon Law: Insanity, Executions, and Oklahoma
Criminal Procedure, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 671 (2000); Barbara A. Ward, Competency for
Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 49-56 (1986).
17. Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious
Abstention, Professional Ethics and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 67, 86-88 (1990).
18. 13 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 876.
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guilty of [the] crime" was sufficient to support the state habeas court's
legal conclusion that he was competent to be executed. z
More recently, a Texas federal district court relied on the narrow
Barnard definition when it found Scott Panetti, another delusional
prisoner, competent to be executed.2 1 Expert testimony introduced on
Panetti's behalf tended to show that he "does not even understand that
the State of Texas is a lawfully constituted authority, but rather, he
believes the State is in league with the forces of evil that have conspired
against him" and that he "believes the real reason he is to be executed is
for preaching the Gospel. 22 However, the district court concluded that,
under Barnard, Panetti's "delusional beliefs-even those which may
result in a fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the
petitioner's crime and his execution-do not bear on the question of
whether [he] 'knows the reason for his execution' for the purposes of the
Eighth Amendment. 2 3 Because Panetti "knows he committed two
murders, he knows he is to be executed, and he knows the reason the
State has given for his execution is his commission of those murders, he is
competent to be executed.
2 4
In order to emphasize the need for a deeper understanding of the
state's justifying purpose for the execution, the ABA Task Force's
proposal would require that an offender not only must "understand" the
nature and purpose of punishment but also must "appreciate" its
personal application in his own case-that is, why it is being imposed on
him. 5 This formulation is analogous to the distinction often drawn
between a "factual understanding" and a "rational understanding" of the
reason for the execution. 6 If, as is generally assumed, the primary
purpose of the competence-to-be-executed requirement is to vindicate
the retributive aim of punishment, then offenders should have more than
a shallow understanding of why they are being executed.
2. What Procedures Should Be Required for the Competence
Determination?
State courts have disagreed about the procedures required to make
Ford competence determinations. A sensible outline of the required
20. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis omitted).
21. Panetti v. Dretke, No. A-04-CA-042-SS (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004) (order




25. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 2, § 3(a).
26. See Martin v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 185, 188 n. (Fla. 1987).
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procedures appears in the ABA Standard 7.5-727 and the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Coe v. Bell.2 The prisoner is entitled to state-subsidized
counsel and expert assessment once evidence raising a significant doubt
about his competence is discovered. 9 The issue should be adjudicated at
a hearing before a judge at which the prisoner bears the burden of
proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. °
3. If the Prisoner Is Found Incompetent for Execution, Should
Treatment Be Undertaken to Restore Competence?
Whether a person found incompetent to be executed should be treated
has been highly controversial because it implicates not only the
prisoner's constitutional right to refuse treatment but also the ethicalinterityof te mntalhealh • 31
integrity of the mental health professions. The drafters of the ABA
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards took note of this problem in
1987, but declined to address it.32 What should be done?
Consider first the prisoner who objects to treatment. Does the
Constitution permit the state to forcibly medicate him for the purpose of
restoring his competence for execution? Admittedly, the state has a
powerful interest in carrying out the sentence of death, an interest
perhaps even more compelling than the state's generic interest in
bringing criminal cases to trial that was at stake in Sell v. United States.33
Some courts have decided that the government may forcibly medicate
incompetent individuals, if necessary to render them competent to be
executed, on the ground that once an individual is fairly convicted and
sentenced to death, the state's interest in carrying out the sentence
outweighs any individual interest in avoiding medication.34 However,
27. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.7 (1988).
28. 209 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2000).
29. See id. at 818-20; ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §§ 7-
5.7(a)-(d) (1988).
30. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §§ 7-5.7(c)-(f) (1988);
see also Paul F. Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishment and the Incompetent:
Procedures for Determining Competency To Be Executed After Ford v. Wainwright, 41
FLA. L. REV. 115,133-36 (1989).
31. See Bonnie, supra note 17, at 82-86; Richard J. Bonnie, Medical Ethics and the
Death Penalty, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May/June 1990, at 12, 15-17 [hereinafter Bonnie,
Medical Ethics]; Richard J. Bonnie, The Death Penalty: When Doctors Must Say No, 305
BRIT. MED. J. 381, 382 (1992); Kirk Heilbrun et al., The Debate on Treating Individuals
Incompetent for Execution, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 596, 596-97, 604 (1992); Douglas
Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6-9, 22, 35 (1992).
32. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.7 cmt. (1988).
33. 539 U.S. 166,169,180 (2003).
34. E.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025-27 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
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treating a condemned prisoner, especially over his objection, for the
acknowledged purpose of enabling the state to execute him strikes many
observers as barbaric and also violates fundamental ethical norms of the
mental health professions.35
According to nearly universal ethical opinion within the mental health
professions, treatment with the purpose or inevitable effect of enabling
the state to carry out an otherwise prohibited execution is unethical,
whether or not the prisoner objects, except in two highly restricted
circumstances (an advance directive by the prisoner while competent
requesting such treatment or a compelling need to alleviate extreme
suffering).36  Because treatment is unethical, it is not "medically
appropriate" and is therefore constitutionally impermissible when a
prisoner objects under the criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Sell" and Washington v. Harper.3" As the Louisiana Supreme Court
observed in State v. Perry,3 9 medical treatment to restore execution
competence "is antithetical to the basic principles of the healing arts,"
fails to "measurably contribute to the social goals of capital punishment,"
and "is apt to be administered erroneously, arbitrarily or capriciously."4
There is only one sensible solution to this dilemma:4 a death sentence
should be automatically commuted to a lesser punishment after a
prisoner has been found incompetent for execution. Maryland has so
prescribed. The Task Force Recommendations also embrace this view.
Once an offender is found incompetent to be executed, execution should
no longer be a permissible punishment.
4. When Should Courts Be Willing to Adjudicate Claims of Ford
Incompetence?
When should courts be willing to entertain Ford claims? The current
practice is to do so only when execution is genuinely imminent.43 Should
courts be willing to adjudicate these claims at an earlier time?
35. See Heilbrun et al., supra note 31, at 599.
36. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychiatric Association and American
Medical Association at *6-*20, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120), 1990
WL 10013108; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Physician
Participation in Capital Punishment, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 365, 365-68 (1993); see also
Bonnie, Medical Ethics, supra note 31, at 16.
37. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
38. 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
39. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
40. Id. at 747-48, 751.
41. A state could try to restore a prisoner's competence without medical treatment,
but the prospects of an enduring change in the prisoner's condition are slight.
42. MD. CODE ANN., CORRECTIONAL SERVICES §§ 3-904(c), (h)(2) (1999).
43. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406 (1993).
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Unfortunately, instead of alleviating the clinician's ethical dilemma, this
approach would simply revive it. Assuming that a judicial finding of
incompetence-whenever rendered-would bar execution (as proposed
above), condemned prisoners and their lawyers would have powerful
incentives to allow mental illness to remain untreated (as well as to
fabricate or exaggerate symptoms) as soon as a Ford hearing is legally
available. It would be a sorry spectacle indeed if prisoners who had been
stabilized on anti-psychotic medication to stand trial suddenly terminated
their medication as soon as they were placed on death row. When, if
ever, could treatment be ordered over the defendant's objection under
these circumstances? And what should the treating psychiatrist do?
Because a purposeful failure to treat could be viewed as an instrument of
compassion, it is likely that many clinicians would be deterred from
providing any treatment needed to prevent deterioration. To avoid such
morally perverse incentives, Ford adjudications should be available only
when legal challenges to the validity of the conviction and sentence have
been exhausted, and execution has been scheduled.44  If such
adjudications were permitted at any earlier time, I see no way to avoid a
very slippery slope.45 Section 3(d) of the Task Force Recommendations
embraces this view:
44. This does not preclude litigation challenging the validity of the sentence from
simultaneously occurring. For all practical purposes, "exhaustion" means that one full
sequence of state habeas review and federal habeas review have occurred. No execution
date set during the initial rounds of state and collateral review is a "real" date. However,
given the many procedural barriers to successive petitions for collateral review, an
execution date set after the completion of the initial rounds may be intended by the state
to be a "real" date, even if a successive petition has been filed or is being planned. In such
a case, the state may contest the prisoner's request for a stay of execution. In the Task
Force's view, a Ford claim should be considered on its merits in such a case.
45. If treatment of a condemned prisoner to restore competence after being found
incompetent is unethical, is it also unethical to treat a prisoner whose collateral appeals
have been exhausted, whose condition is deteriorating, and who might be found
incompetent if the matter were adjudicated? Does the imminence of execution override
an otherwise legitimate clinical justification for consensual treatment?
What if collateral appeals have not yet been exhausted? What if they have just begun?
A strong ethical barrier against treating prisoners who might be Ford-incompetent could
become a justification for refusing to treat all mentally ill prisoners on death row. Surely
this cannot be a morally proper response either by correctional authorities or mental
health professionals. The only sensible place to draw the line, in my opinion, is after a
court has found the prisoner incompetent under Ford. Before that point, treatment is
ethical if it is otherwise medically appropriate. Once the prisoner has been found Ford-
incompetent by a court, however, treatment is almost always unethical, and the sentence
should be commuted.
These observations have been addressed to the ethical issues associated with
consensual treatment. If a condemned prisoner objects to treatment at any time, however,
it should not be provided unless ordered by a court in conformity with applicable state law
1176
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Procedure in Cases Involving Prisoners Unable to Understand
the Punishment or its Purpose. If, after challenges to the
validity of the conviction and death sentence have been
exhausted and execution has been scheduled, a court finds that
a prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly
impairs his or her capacity to understand the nature and
purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its
imposition in the prisoner's own case, the sentence of death
should be reduced to a lesser punishment.4
II. IMPAIRED ABILITY TO ASSIST COUNSEL IN POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS
Although Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford suggested that
awareness of the nature and purpose of the punishment is the sole test
for execution competence, he acknowledged the possibility that a
severely mentally ill prisoner who understands the nature and purpose of
the punishment may nonetheless be unable to provide meaningful
assistance to his lawyer during the post-conviction process, thereby
raising doubts about the reliability of any adjudication bearing on the
validity of the conviction or death sentence. 7 Indeed, Sir William
Blackstone linked the prohibition against executing "insane" prisoners to
the possibility that "had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might
have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution."4 However,
Justice Powell observed that the risk of injustice was greater in
Blackstone's day, when executions followed quickly after trial, than it is
today, when extensive review of death sentences is provided in both state
and federal courts.49
Not everyone has agreed with Justice Powell. Several states have
included inability to assist counsel as a ground for precluding execution,0
as did the drafters of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.
Standard 7-5.6 provides that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed "if,
as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, [he] lacks sufficient
capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might exist which
and with federal constitutional requirements. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227
(1990).
46. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 2, § 3(d).
47. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420-21 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 407 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25).
49. Id. at 420-21 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
50. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 57-58 (S.C. 1993); State v. Harris, 789
P.2d 60, 65 (Wash. 1990); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889,913 (Wash. 1988).
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would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to
convey such information to counsel or to the court."5'
Focusing exclusively on the conditions under which execution should
be precluded (i.e., on the "definition" of incompetence for execution)
misses the real target, in my opinion. The underlying issue is the impact
that the prisoner's possible incompetence should have on the post-
conviction proceedings themselves. As already noted, courts typically
will not entertain claims of incompetence for execution until all avenues
of collateral relief have been exhausted.2 From this standpoint, Justice
Powell must have been assuming that prisoners on the threshold of
execution have already taken advantage of these post-conviction
opportunities, leaving little risk that some critically important fact has
been obscured throughout these proceedings or that a previously
unknown defect in the conviction or sentence could yet emerge. These
assumptions are warranted, of course, only if a prisoner's impaired
capacity to assist in post-conviction litigation would have been identified
during the post-conviction proceedings, leading the courts to take
appropriate precautionary action. However, one of the puzzles of
current habeas practice is that the prisoner's incompetence is not
ordinarily recognized as a basis for suspending collateral litigation. This
is where the problem lies and this is the deficiency that the ABA Task
Force set out to address.53
A prisoner's inability to assist in post-conviction litigation must be
addressed in a comprehensive manner and not only as a possible element
of the Eighth Amendment bar against execution of a presently
incompetent person. On the one hand, the rules governing collateral
proceedings should be modified to protect the integrity of these
proceedings long before an issue arises concerning whether an execution
should go forward. On the other hand, if the collateral proceedings have
been fully and fairly litigated, inability to assist counsel on the eve of
execution may no longer be relevant, just as Justice Powell suggested. 4
Thus, the overriding question is whether impaired competence to
participate in adjudication should have any bearing on the initiation or
continuation of post-conviction proceedings.
The law in this area is both undeveloped and uncertain in many
respects. However, some principles have begun to emerge, and these will
be summarized before turning to the remaining puzzles.
51. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6 (1988).
52. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
53. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 2, § 3(c).
54. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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A. Principles
1. Proof that a Prisoner's Incompetence Prevented Potentially Valid
Claims from Being Raised, or Obscured Potentially Relevant Evidence
in Earlier Post-Conviction Proceedings, Should Constitute "Cause" for
Addressing Otherwise Defaulted Claims on the Merits in Subsequent
Proceedings if the Prisoner Has Regained the Necessary Capacity, and
Should Bar Execution if the Prisoner Has Not Regained Capacity
Under the laws of many states and the Federal Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),55 collateral proceedings are
barred if they are not initiated within a specified period of time. 6
However, it is undisputed that a prisoner's failure to file within the
specified time must be excused if such failure was attributable to a
mental disability that impaired the prisoner's ability to recognize the
basis for, or to take advantage of, possible collateral remedies.57
Similarly, the prisoner should be able to lodge new claims, or relitigate
previously raised claims, if the newly available evidence upon which the
claim would have been based, or which would have been presented
during the earlier proceeding relating to the claim, was unavailable to
counsel due to the prisoner's mental disorder or disability.
58
Assuming, however, that collateral proceedings have been initiated in
a timely fashion, the more difficult question is whether, and under what
circumstances, a prisoner's mental disability should require suspension of
the proceedings altogether.
2. Courts Should Suspend Post-Conviction Proceedings upon Proof
that a Prisoner Is Incompetent to Assist Counsel in Such Proceedings
and that the Prisoner's Participation Is Necessary for Fair Resolution of
a Specific Claim
Thorough post-conviction review of the legality of death sentences has
become an integral component of modern death penalty law, analogous
in some respects to direct review. Any impediment to thorough
collateral review undermines the integrity of the review process and
therefore of the death sentence itself. However, habeas review is still
collateral to the "main event" at trial and its review on direct appeal.
The prisoner has no constitutional right to collateral review or to the
55. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
56. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2262-66 (2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(c)
(McKinney 1994).
57. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
58. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271,285 (Pa. 2002); Council v. Catoe,
597 S.E.2d 782, 787 (S.C. 2004).
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assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings.5 9 Suspending collateral
proceedings upon proof of the prisoner's incompetence could invite
malingering and manipulation. Here is one context where the "death is
different" argument must be used cautiously lest it be allowed to nullify
the state's interest in the finality of the judgment affirmed on direct
review as well as the state's legitimate interest in carrying out the death
sentence.
No state now precludes continuation of the proceedings based solely
on the prisoner's incompetence. 60  Many issues raised in collateral
proceedings can be adjudicated without the prisoner's participation and
these matters should be litigated according to customary practice.
However, a prisoner's impairments could obscure potentially valid
claims, preventing counsel from finding out about them at all, or could
inhibit his effective participation in an evidentiary hearing involving
specific claims that are known to counsel. These problems are most
likely to bear on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel (e.g., trial
counsel's failure to provide satisfactory advice, or to seek or develop
possibly exculpatory or mitigating evidence). A consensus seems to be
emerging that collateral proceedings should be suspended if and only if
the prisoner's counsel makes a substantial and particularized showing
that the prisoner's impairment would prevent a fair and accurate
resolution of specific claims."
59. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 & n.2 (1986).
61. Catoe, 597 S.E.2d at 787. The court in Catoe stated:
[T]he default rule is that [post-conviction review] hearings must proceed even
though a petitioner is incompetent. For issues requiring the petitioner's
competence to assist his [post-conviction] counsel, such as a fact-based challenge
to his defense counsel's conduct at trial, the [post-conviction] judge may grant a
continuance, staying the review of those issues until petitioner regains his
competence.
Id.; see also People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 414 (Cal. 1992) ("[Mlental incompetence,
although a basis for allowing 'next friend' standing to challenge the judgment, does not
require cessation of postjudgment proceedings."); Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873, 875-76
(Fla. 1997) ("If a postconviction defendant is found incompetent, claims raising purely
legal issues that are of record and claims that do not otherwise require the defendant's
input must proceed."); State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 735 (Wis. 1994) ("Pending
the determination of competency and even after a determination of incompetency,
defense counsel should initiate or continue postconviction relief on a defendant's behalf
when any issues rest on the circuit court record, do not necessitate the defendant's
assistance or decisionmaking, and involve no risk to the defendant.") (non-capital case).
Courts have divided on whether the habeas court should order examination and make a
finding on the prisoner's competence for post-conviction adjudication once it has been
raised by the prisoner's attorney. One view is that because incompetence is not a barrier
to adjudication, there is no need for the matter to be adjudicated. Kelly, 822 P.2d at 413.
The contrary view is that the issue should be determined to establish a record on the
matter in the event that the prisoner's incompetence is involved as "cause" for
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3. Proof that a Prisoner's Capacity to Understand or Communicate
Information, or Otherwise to Assist Counsel Is Significantly Impaired,
and that the Prisoner's Participation Is Necessary for a Fair Resolution
of Specific Claims Bearing on the Validity of the Conviction or Death
Sentence, Should Bar Execution
It follows from what has already been said that if the prisoner's
incapacity to assist counsel warrants suspending the collateral
proceedings, it should bar execution as well, just as ABA Standards
recommend and the laws of several states now provide.6 ' ABA Standard
7-5.6 provides that prisoners should not be executed if they cannot
understand the nature of the pending proceedings or if they "lack[]
sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might exist
which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lack[] the
ability to convey such information to counsel or the court." 63 As the
commentary to Standard 7-5.6 indicates, "[t]he rule rests less on
sympathy for the sentenced convict than on concern for the integrity of
the criminal justice system." 6 Scores of people on death row have been
exonerated based on claims of factual innocence, and many more
offenders have been removed from death row and given sentences less
65than death because of subsequent discovery of mitigating evidence.
The possibility, however slim, that incompetent individuals may not be
able to assist counsel in reconstructing a viable factual or legal claim
requires that executions be barred under these circumstances.
4. The Death Sentence Should Be Commuted If the Proceedings Have
Been Suspended and the Prisoner's Competence Is Not Likely to Be
Restored
Once the post-conviction proceedings have been suspended on
grounds of the prisoner's incompetence to assist counsel, what should
happen to the death sentence? The situation is analogous to the
suspension of criminal proceedings before trial; in that context, the
proceedings are typically terminated (and charges are dismissed) after a
specified period if a court has found that competence for adjudication is
not likely to be restored in the foreseeable future.66 In the present
context, it would be unfair to hold the death sentence in perpetual
reconsideration of otherwise forfeited claims at a later time. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d at
735. The latter view is preferable.
62. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (West 2002).
63. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6 (1988).
64. Id. § 7-5.6 cmt.
65. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE: FREED FROM DEATH ROW,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited June 4, 2005).
66. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6 (West Supp. 2004).
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suspension. In another concession to the "qualitative difference"
between death and other punishments, a judicial finding that the
prisoner's competence to assist counsel is not likely to be restored in the
foreseeable future should trigger an automatic reduction of the sentence
to a lesser punishment, as the ABA Task Force has recommended.
Here is language concerning competence to assist counsel proposed by
the ABA Task Force:
Procedures in Cases Involving Prisoners Unable to Assist
Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings. If a court finds at any
time that a prisoner under sentence of death has a mental
disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her
capacity to understand or communicate pertinent information
or otherwise to assist counsel, in connection with post-
conviction proceedings, and that the prisoner's participation is
necessary for a fair resolution of specific claims bearing on the
validity of the conviction or death sentence, the court should
suspend the proceedings. If the court finds that there is no
significant likelihood of restoring the prisoner's capacity to
participate in post-conviction proceedings in the foreseeable
future, it should reduce the prisoner's sentence to a lesser
•67
punishment.
B. A Remaining Puzzle: Should Treatment to Restore Competence Be
Ordered During Collateral Proceedings?
In light of the usual practice of post-conviction litigation, there is
typically no need for the court to order treatment to restore the
prisoner's competence for post-conviction adjudication. The litigation
will move forward notwithstanding the prisoner's incompetence and will
resolve most, if not all, claims. To the extent that some claims may be
obscured by the prisoner's incompetence, the prisoner (on counsel's
advice) has an incentive to seek treatment in order to identify and
present all available challenges to the conviction and sentence. 8 Under
these circumstances, mental health professionals should have no ethical
qualms about providing requested treatment on a consensual basis:
Doing so enhances the prisoner's autonomy and his capability to assist in
post-conviction litigation, and would not remove any legal impediment to
67. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 2, § 3(c). The terms "post-conviction
proceeding" and "proceeding" in the Task Force Recommendations refer to direct appeal,
state post-conviction proceedings, including requests for review by the state's highest court
and by the U.S. Supreme Court, and federal habeas corpus proceedings, including requests
for review by the Supreme Court.
68. Only if the prisoner is incompetent under Ford and likely to remain so in the
absence of treatment does the prisoner have an incentive to refuse treatment.
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execution (as would treatment of a prisoner already found to be
incompetent for execution).
As suggested above, however, collateral proceedings should be
suspended if the prisoner's participation is required for a fair
adjudication. If proceedings have been suspended, should treatment be
ordered to restore the prisoner's competence? Even if the prisoner
objects? Whether it is lawful to order treatment over the prisoner's
objection under these circumstances would be governed by the criteria
set forth by the Supreme Court in Sell v. United States.6 9 As noted above,
it is likely that these criteria could be met in cases involving collateral
challenges to death sentences.
Aside from the constitutional issues, however, treatment of
condemned prisoners to restore their competence for post-conviction
proceedings raises the familiar ethical dilemma for mental health
professionals. On the one hand, the legal context is similar to that
presented by Ford claims since execution is legally precluded unless the
prisoner's competence is restored.70 In this sense, the inevitable effect of
successful treatment is to remove a barrier to execution. On the other
hand, even if the prisoner's capacity is restored, the direct and immediate
effect is simply to revive the post-conviction adjudication. In this respect,
the procedural posture is similar to treatment to restore competence to
stand trial in a capital case: competence restoration allows the prisoner's
legal challenges to proceed; it does not open the door to execution.
Obviously, restoring competence to participate in post-conviction
proceedings falls somewhere between restoring competence to stand trial
on capital charges (ethically permissible) and restoring competence for
execution under Ford (ethically impermissible). Admittedly the
connection between the clinician's actions and the execution, if one
occurs, is not as remote as it is before trial, but neither is it as immediate
and direct as it is under Ford when all judicial remedies have been
exhausted and execution is imminent.
This is a perplexing problem, and the Task Force did not take a
position on it. My own inclination is to say that treatment is ethically
permissible under these circumstances.
69. 539 U.S. 166, 180-83 (2003).
70. It is therefore equivalent to the situation envisioned by the drafters of the ABA
Standards and those states (such as South Carolina) that include capacity to assist counsel
as a component of the test for execution competence. See Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d
53, 56-58 (S.C. 1993); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6(b)
(1988).
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III. IMPAIRED ABILITY TO MAKE A RATIONAL DECISION TO FORGO
POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
According to John Blume, twelve percent of the prisoners executed in
the post-Gregg era have been so-called "volunteers."71 The literature
reveals a genuine and deeply felt ethical disagreement about whether
attorneys and courts should accede to the wishes of prisoners who seek
to forgo or abandon their "appeals," including direct appeal as well as
collateral review.72 It also echoes the even more anguishing problems
that arise during the criminal prosecution itself, when the defendant
seeks to waive counsel altogether, to sabotage counsel's representation,
to plead guilty, to forbid counsel from exploring or presenting mitigating
evidence, or requests the judge to impose a death sentence."
I have taken the view that respect for the dignity of the defendant or
condemned prisoner requires counsel to adhere to the wishes of a
competent client and precludes the courts from directing otherwise, as
long as the substantive predicates for a death sentence under state law
and the Federal Constitution have been established 4 Others disagree,
insisting that executing prisoners who abandon their appeals amounts to
"state-assisted suicide."75  The United States Supreme Court has
endorsed the traditional understanding,6 and I will take that as my
starting point. The "puzzles" in this context relate to the meaning of
competence and the consequences of a finding of competence.
71. John Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939, 940 (2005).
72. See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1380-89; Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness,
Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
541, 542-45 (2003); C. Lee Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision
Making: Death Row Volunteering and Euthanasia, 29 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1109,
1145 (2004); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness,
and Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 876-94
(1983); Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265,
1296-99 (2001).
73. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 579-80 (1993); cf. Linda E. Carter, Maintaining
Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel To Present
Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
74. Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1389.
75. Blume, supra note 71, at 942; see also Strafer, supra note 72, at 903-04.
76. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (order terminating stay of
execution).
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A. Basic Principle: If the Prisoner Is Not Competent to Make a Rational
Decision, the Court Should Authorize a Next Friend to Initiate and Pursue
Collateral Relief
The standard procedure is to allow a so-called "next friend" (including
the attorney) to pursue direct appeal and collateral proceedings aiming
to set aside the conviction or sentence if the prisoner is shown to lack the
capacity to make a rational decision.7  The Task Force
Recommendations are clear and straightforward on this point:
Procedures in Cases Involving Prisoners Seeking to Forgo or
Terminate Post-Conviction Proceedings. If a court finds that a
prisoner under sentence of death who wishes to forgo or
terminate post-conviction proceedings has a mental disorder or
disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity to make a
rational decision, the court should permit a next friend acting
on the prisoner's behalf to initiate or pursue available remedies
to set aside the conviction or death sentence 8
B. The Puzzles
Several complex questions lurk beneath the surface of this simple
proposition. Although the Task Force took no position on them, I will
present my own views below.
1. What Does "Competence" Mean?
A cursory review of the reported cases concerning prisoners who seek
execution suggests that the courts are highly reluctant to find prisoners
incompetent to make decisions regarding post-conviction challenges (or
even pre-conviction waivers). No more than five to ten percent are
found incompetent.79 What does competency mean in this context?
The minimum requirement for competence would be what I will call
the "waiver" standard. A valid waiver of the right to pursue post-
conviction remedies requires a knowing and intelligent choice, 8° and
77. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162-63 (1990); Bonnie, supra note 4, at
1366 n.9.
78. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 2, § 3(b).
79. John Blume states, based on his empirical study as well as extensive personal
experience, that "[a]lmost all inmates who attempt to waive their appeals are found
competent." Email from John Blume, Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University to
Richard J. Bonnie, John S. Battle Professor of Law, University of Virginia, Director,
University of Virginia Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy (Feb. 28, 2005, 9:06:46
EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from John Blume]. He estimates that more
than "90 [percent] who persist in their efforts to 'volunteer' are ultimately allowed to do
so." Id.
80. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734 (1990); Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1013.
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"competence" to make a valid waiver essentially requires capacity to
understand the consequences of forgoing or terminating the
proceedings.8 ' The great majority of prisoners who have sought to forgo
or terminate post-conviction proceedings have probably been competent
under this standard-they have known full well that the consequence of
the waiver will be execution. Indeed, the desire for execution is the very
reason for waiving their rights.
The point, of course, is that any meaningful competence inquiry must
focus on the prisoner's reasons for wanting to surrender to the state, and
on the rationality of the prisoner's thinking and reasoning. This was the
focus of the Supreme Court's effort to articulate the governing standard
in Rees v. Peyton." In Rees, the Court instructed the lower court to
determine whether the prisoner had the "capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
substantially affect his capacity in the premises."" The problem with this
standard is that the two alternative findings mentioned by the Court are
not mutually exclusive-a person with a mental disorder that "affects"
his decisionmaking may nonetheless be able to appreciate his position
and make a "rational" choice. For this reason, the lower courts have
integrated the Rees formula into a three-step test: (1) does the prisoner
have a mental disorder?; (2) if so, does this condition prevent him from
understanding his legal position and the options available to him?; and
(3) even if his understanding is unimpaired, does the condition
nonetheless prevent him from making a rational choice among the
options?' 4
The courts have adopted a fairly broad conception of mental disorder
(the first step)85 and the prisoner's understanding of his or her "legal
position" (the second step) is hardly ever in doubt in these cases. Thus,
81. Cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01 & 401 n.12 (1993).
82. 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (remanding case for competency determination after
condemned prisoner directed attorney to withdraw petition for certiorari).
83. Id. at 314.
84. See, e.g., Hauser ex reL Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000);
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1985).
85. See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 2000)
(order issuing stay of execution) (depression), vacated by 531 U.S. 986 (2000); St. Pierre v.
Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2000) (bipolar disorder); Vargas v. Lambert, 159
F.3d 1161, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (order issuing stay of execution) (psychosis), vacated by
525 U.S. 925 (1998); Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 1992) (moderate
depression); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Armontrout, 632 F. Supp. 503, 511-14 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(order continuing stay of execution) (borderline personality disorder), aff'd sub nom.
Smith ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1987).
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virtually all the work under the Rees test is done by the third step.
Conceptually, the question is relatively straightforward-is the prisoner's
decision attributable to the mental disorder or to "rational choice"?
Unequivocal cases of irrationality rarely arise. For example, if an
offender suffering from schizophrenia tells his or her attorney to forgo
appeals because the future of civilization depends upon the offender's
816death, the "reason" for the prisoner's choice can comfortably be
attributed to the psychotic symptom. However, decisions rooted in
delusions are atypical in these cases. The usual case involves articulated
reasons that may seem "rational" under the circumstances, such as (a) a
desire to take responsibility for one's actions and a belief that one
deserves the death penalty or (b) a preference for the death penalty overlife ' "87
life imprisonment. The cases that give the courts the most trouble are
those in which such apparently "rational" reasons are intertwined with
emotional distress (especially depression), feelings of guilt and remorse,
and hopelessness. In many cases, choices that may otherwise seem
"rational" may be rooted in suicidal motivations. Assuming, for
example, that the prisoner is depressed and suicidal but has a genuine
desire to take responsibility, how is one to say which motivation
"predominates"?
John Blume argues that the Rees inquiry should be abandoned
altogether and that suicidal motivation should be sufficient, in itself, to
preclude execution even if the prisoner is not legally incompetent. He
bases his argument on the view that a model derived from the law's
unequivocal ban against assisted suicide89 should be deployed in deciding
whether to honor the condemned prisoner's wishes, displacing the legal
model of prisoner autonomy (with its emphasis on "competence") that
now prevails90 Blume's analysis has strong intuitive appeal and has the
advantage of dispensing with the need to decide whether a given
motivation should or should not be "attributed" to "disorder."91
However, neither courts nor legislators are likely to be willing to depart
from the traditional autonomy model embraced in Rees, with its
dispositive emphasis on incompetence attributable to mental disorder.
Nonetheless, courts and legislatures should pay close attention to
Blume's data regarding the prevalence of significant mental disorder
86. People v. Haynes, 737 N.E.2d 169, 178 (I11. 2000); see also In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d
105, 107 (3rd Cir. 1997) (order continuing stay of execution).
87. See Strafer, supra note 72, at 861-62.
88. See Blume, supra note 71, at 977-82.
89. Id. at 957-60.
90. Id. at 952-53.
91. See id. at 977-82.
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among the 106 prisoners who have volunteered for execution.92
According to Blume, fourteen of the "volunteers" had recorded
diagnoses of schizophrenia, twenty-three had recorded diagnoses of
depression or bipolar disorder, ten had records of post-traumatic stress
disorder, four had diagnoses of borderline personality disorder, and two
had been diagnosed with multiple personality disorder. 9 Another twelve
had unspecified histories of "mental illness." 94
Given this high prevalence of mental illness, the courts should be more
willing than they now are to acknowledge suicidal motivations when they
are evident and should be more inclined than they now are to attribute
suicidal motivations to mental illness. The third step of the Rees test
would then amount to the following: Is the prisoner who seeks execution
able to give plausible reasons for doing so that are clearly not grounded
in symptoms of mental disorder?95 Given the stakes of the decision, a
relatively high degree of rationality ought to be required in order to find
people competent to make decisions to abandon proceedings concerning
96
the validity of a death sentence.
2. Should Treatment Be Provided upon Request to a Prisoner Who Has
Been Found Incompetent to Decide to Forgo or Terminate Post-
Conviction Proceedings?
Should a prisoner, whose desire to forgo or terminate post-conviction
proceedings has been overridden, receive treatment designed to restore
the necessary capacity? The ABA Task Force decided not to address
this issue. In my own view, however, I see no persuasive reason for
withholding treatment from prisoners who seek it. A competent prisoner
is entitled to abandon the litigation. If the prisoner's decision to forgo or
terminate post-conviction proceedings is overridden on the grounds of
doubted competence, the prisoner's desire for autonomy-restoring
treatment should be respected even though one possible consequence of
the treatment is to enable the prisoner to terminate the proceedings and
request execution. It should be emphasized, however, that many
92. Id. at 970.
93. Id. app. B & 971.
94. See id. app. B. The text refers only to significant mental disorders that could have
distorted the prisoner's reasoning process and impaired capacity for "rational choice." See
id. at 970-72. In addition to these cases, Blume reports that seventeen of these prisoners
had histories of substance abuse unaccompanied by any other mental disorder diagnosis,
another seven had personality disorders (with or without substance abuse), and four had
sexual impulse disorders. See id. app. B.
95. See Recs v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966). A more demanding approach would
ask whether the prisoner is able to give plausible reasons that reflect authentic values and
enduring preferences.
96. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1388-89; cf. Bonnie, supra note 73, at 579-80.
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prisoners are likely to change their minds (authorizing post-conviction
proceedings) as a result of successful treatment97
3. Is Competence the Only Issue?
Under prevailing practice, courts are often reluctant to override the
prisoner's preferences in cases involving mixed motivations, and they
may be unwilling to change that practice as suggested above. However,
competence is not the only issue. Even if the prisoner is competent, his
choices may be strongly influenced by situational depression associated
with feelings of guilt and remorse, a condition that is often amenable to
treatment. History shows that many such prisoners change their minds.
9g
For this reason alone, courts should not be in a hurry to proceed in these
cases, and should suspend proceedings or toll statutory time periods to
permit a reasonable period of therapeutic intervention.
This problem is particularly acute in cases where the prisoner's
unwillingness to contest a death sentence takes root immediately after
the crime. Two cases brought to the attention of the Supreme Court
graphically illustrate the problem. Gary Gilmore, whose case was
immortalized by Norman Mailer in The Executioner's Song, was
sentenced to death on October 7, 1976, three months after his arrest for
killing a gas station attendant and a motel manager in separate incidents
over the course of two days.99 He was executed on January 17, 1977,
after waiving his right to direct appeal, and after the Supreme Court
declined to intervene, rejecting his mother's effort, as his "next friend,"
to stay the execution.0 Gilmore insisted that he had been treated fairly
97. John Blume has estimated, based on his empirical study of "volunteers," that
about half of the prisoners who seek to forgo or terminate judicial proceedings eventually
change their minds. Email from John Blume, supra note 79.
98. See Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853,
854-55 (1987).
99. NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979).
100. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013-14 (1976) (terminating stay of execution on
the ground that Gilmore had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to seek federal
relief and that his mother lacked standing as "next friend" to seek a stay). Gilmore had
been found competent to stand trial by several examining psychiatrists, and was later
found competent to waive his right to direct appeal by a prison psychiatrist. Id. at 1015 n.5
(Burger, J., concurring). Justice Marshall expressed skepticism about the competency
finding:
I cannot agree ... that Gilmore has competently, knowingly, and intelligently
decided to let himself be killed. Less than five months have passed since the
commission of the crime; just over two months have elapsed since sentence was
imposed. That is hardly sufficient time for mature consideration of the question,
nor does Gilmore's erratic behavior.., evidence such deliberation.
Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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by the state of Utah in all respects save its unwillingness to execute him
more quickly.' He attempted suicide in prison to make the point. '0
The second case, discussed in a previous work of mine, also illustrates
this problem:
Richard Moran was charged with three counts of capital
murder in Nevada for killing two people in a bar on August 2,
1984 and for shooting his former wife in a separate incident
seven days later. Immediately after shooting his wife, Moran
attempted suicide by shooting himself in the abdomen and
slashing his wrists. While in the hospital recovering from his
wounds, he summoned the police and confessed to all three
homicides. Soon after discharge from the hospital, he was
referred for forensic assessment of his competence to stand
trial, and two examining psychiatrists interviewed him
separately [in mid-September]. Each psychiatrist concluded
that Moran understood the charges and was able to assist his
attorney. Taking note of his depression and remorse, one of the
psychiatrists observed that "Moran may not make the effort
necessary to assist counsel in his own defense." The record also
shows that Moran was prescribed several depressants and anti-
anxiety drugs during the pretrial period.
[I]n November, [only three months after the offense]
Moran appeared in court, "expressed extreme remorse" for the
killings, discharged his counsel, changed his pleas to guilty,
refused the trial court's offer of standby counsel, and
announced that he wanted no mitigating evidence presented on
his behalf at the sentencing proceeding. The trial court
accepted Moran's waiver of counsel and pleas of guilty after
conducting a plea colloquy during which Moran uttered
"monosyllabic responses to leading questions from the court
about his legal rights and the charged offense." In January,
1985 [five months after the offenses], a three-judge panel
imposed death sentences for each of the three homicides....
Wholesale capitulation by remorseful capital defendants is
not unusual. Such defendants typically insist on pleading guilty
against counsel's advice and instruct counsel to refrain from
introducing any evidence in mitigation, or like Richard Moran,
they discharge their attorneys and plead guilty while
unrepresented. These defendants also frequently request
sentences of death.10 3
101. Id. at 1013 n.1; MAILER, supra note 99, at 490-92.
102. See MAILER, supra note 99, at 590.
103. Bonnie, supra note 73, at 587-88 (footnotes omitted).
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Why are courts in such a hurry in cases like this? The prosecution is all
too willing to take advantage of the defendant's surrender, seeking what
is essentially an uncontested death penalty, and trial judges are all too
willing to stand by and let it happen. Why? Even if these defendants are
competent to waive their rights, the courts are not obliged to accede to
the defendant's wishes to expedite the proceedings. Why don't the
courts insist on a waiting period?
After the damage is done, many of these defendants change their
minds. The following passage illustrates this fact:
Capital defendants who have failed to defend themselves or
seek leniency at trial and who have received death sentences
often regret their behavior thereafter. They then file appeals or
habeas petitions seeking to nullify the convictions and death
sentences they so ardently sought. The possibility of strategic
behavior in such cases cannot be altogether ruled out, but the
most likely explanation is that medication, counseling, and the
passage of time alleviate the prisoners' acute distress and[, as a
result,] they eventually come to prefer life, even with suffering
and guilt, to death. [Richard Moran changed his mind, filing a]
state habeas petition in July of 1987. Among other claims, he
alleged that he had not been competent to waive counsel or to
enter valid guilty pleas in November of 1984 and that, in any
event, the trial court had not undertaken a constitutionally
adequate inquiry regarding his competence to do so.104
That was only one of the trial court's mistakes, in my opinion.
However, the same judge, on state habeas, managed to make the
necessary factual findings to insulate his rulings from reversal, and the
Supreme Court refused to do anything about it, making bad law in the105process.
We don't know whether Gary Gilmore would have changed his mind
because the Supreme Court of Utah allowed him to waive direct review,
and the U.S. Supreme Court was unwilling to slow down the train as it
106headed toward the hastiest execution of the modern era.
Courts should not allow depressed defendants to sabotage their legal
defense. They should, in effect, require a "waiting period" before a
defendant is permitted to waive counsel at trial (or make other decisions
not to contest the death penalty) or to forgo post-conviction proceedings.
In this respect, at least, the analogy with suicide is an apt one. A genuine
screen for depression and a waiting period are morally essential
104. Id. at 588 (footnote omitted).
105. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392-93 (1993); Bonnie, supra note 73, at 588.
106. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1013; accord id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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components of a law allowing physician-assisted suicide. 107 In the context
of capital prosecutions and collateral review of death sentences, such
requirements are a relatively costless concession to the undeniable truth
that "death is qualitatively different" from other punishments, however
severe.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the context of deep and enduring disagreement about the
desirability of capital punishment, courts and legislatures in thirty-eight
states face the challenge of designing and administering a fair and
humane system for imposing this controversial sanction while being
respectful of the popular will. One increasingly scrutinized issue is the
execution of offenders with serious mental illness. Although firm
estimates are not available, the prevalence of serious mental illness on
death row is likely higher than most readers imagine-perhaps as high as
five to ten percent at any point in time. The ABA Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty has formulated three proposals
designed to preclude execution of condemned prisoners with severe
mental illness while also taking adequate account of the societal interest
in carrying out executions in cases involving the most heinous crimes.
The two parts of the Task Force's three-part recommendation discussed
by Professor Slobogin aim to reduce the number of mentally disordered
offenders sentenced to death. Even if these two proposals are adopted,
however, difficult legal problems will continue to arise when condemned
prisoners experience symptoms of severe mental illness on death row.
The third part of the Task Force's recommendation aims to deal with
these problems.
The Task Force proposal deals, respectively, with impairments of
decisional competence in forgoing legal challenges to the death sentence,
competence to assist counsel in post-conviction adjudication, and
competence at the time of execution. Ultimately, these proposals aim to
counteract unseemly haste in executing acutely disturbed prisoners who
seek to terminate their appeals while respecting the "dignity of the
condemned"; to minimize mistakes in post-conviction adjudication; and
to avoid the morally appalling prospects of executing a prisoner who
lacks a genuine moral understanding of the nature or purpose of the
execution or of medicating such a prisoner for the sole purpose of
enabling the state to carry out the execution. In this Article, I have
sought to explain the Task Force's rationale for these proposals, to point
107. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.820, .850 (2003); Franklin G. Miller et al.,
Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119,120-21 (1994).
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the way toward their successful implementation, and to identify the
problems the Task Force proposals leave unsolved.
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